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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the enforcement 
of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) from 1946 to 
1978. This period encompasses the early regulation of the Texas 
accounting profession after the passage of the Texas Public Accoun-
tancy Act (Act) in 1945. The Act and accompanying Rules remained 
in effect until 1979, when the Texas legislature enacted new accoun-
tancy legislation which inaugurated a more regulatory era. 
Results indicate that enforcement of the Rules of Conduct was a 
process evolving over time as both the state and professional politi-
cal systems impacted the behavior of the Texas State Board of Pub-
lic Accountancy. During the period under study, internal profes-
s ional compet i t ion be tween cert if ied publ ic a c c o u n t a n t s and 
non-certified public accountants surfaced as a substantial explana-
tory factor behind rule promulgation and enforcement. Violators 
differed from non-violators in level of education, type of training, 
and type of practice. In total numbers , certified public accountants 
were subject to more hearings and sanctions than non-certified pub-
lic accountants. However, in accordance with expectations, the pub-
lic accountants received a disproportionate share of alleged viola-
tions and sanctions. Violations implying practice incompetence and 
those impairing professional integrity were subject to more severe 
disciplinary actions, but the Board heard more competitive behavior 
allegations than those involving malpractice. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the enforcement of 
the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) from 1946 to 
1978. This period encompasses the early regulation of the Texas 
accounting profession after the passage of the Texas Public Ac-
countancy Act (Act) in 1945. The Act and accompanying Rules 
remained in effect until 1979, when the Texas legislature en-
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acted new accountancy legislation which inaugurated a more 
stringent regulatory era. 
The paper addresses whether the early regulatory process 
was able to find and sanction offenders within the profession. 
The research specifically investigates the following questions: 
1. What type of violations triggered hearings and pun-
ishment under the 1945 Act and Rules? 
2. Did the demographics of violators differ from the 
demographics of non-violators? 
3. Did violations and punishment change as the 1945 
Act and Rules were amended? 
Rules violations during the period under study are catego-
rized into three classifications: those pertaining to morality and 
societal relationships (integrity), responsibility to clients and 
technical competence (practice), and competit ive behavior 
among colleagues (competition). We examine the violations in 
light of practitioner demographic characteristics that include 
level of education, type of training, and type of practice. We 
also compare enforcement activity between certified (CPAs) and 
non-certified public accountants (PAs) and relate that activity 
to an increased power of the State to sanction.1 
Based upon the literature from the sociology of professions 
and the history of the profession in Texas, we expect to find 
differences in the demographics between alleged violators and 
non-violators. Results indicate that enforcement of the Rules of 
Conduct evolved as a process over time as the political system 
impacted the behavior of the Texas State Board of Public Ac-
countancy (Board). During the period under study, internal 
professional competition surfaced as a substantial explanatory 
factor behind rule promulgation and enforcement.2 Education, 
often advocated by accountants as an attribute requisite to 
maintaining competence and substantiating professional integ-
rity, emerged as a differentiating variable between violators and 
non-violators. Violators also differed from non-violators in type 
1Non-certified public accountants, who did not become registered until the 
1945 Act, performed services similar to those of CPAs and sat on the Texas 
State Board of Public Accountancy through 1981 [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 22, 24, 
27, 29, 85]. 
2Although Board records indicate an active pursuit of unlicensed book-
keepers and tax preparers holding out as accountants, this study does not 
examine sanctions against these competitive forces external to the accounting 
profession. 
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of training, and type of practice. In total numbers, CPAs were 
subject to more hearings and sanctions than PAs. However, in 
accordance with expectations, PAs received a disproportionate 
share of alleged violations and sanctions. In addition, the Board 
heard more competitive behavior allegations than those involv-
ing malpractice, but violations implying practice incompetence 
and those impairing professional integrity were subject to more 
severe disciplinary actions. 
In the subsequent sections of this paper we first discuss the 
literature of the sociology of professions. Then we briefly corre-
late the history of Texas accounting professional regulation 
with that prevalent elsewhere in the United States (U.S.) from 
the period of 1896 to 1979. Testable hypotheses are provided in 
the next section. A discussion of data collection and statistical 
methodology appears in section four followed by the results of 
the analysis. A discussion of the results and conclusions are 
provided in the final section. 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS 
Researchers in the sociology of professions posit that mem-
bers of occupational groups employ specialized knowledge, 
credentialism, professional associations, and closure to estab-
lish professions that externally delineate their disciplines from 
other invading occupat ions [Wilensky, 1964, pp. 142-146; 
Larson, 1977, pp. x-xi, xvii, 225; Lubell, 1980, pp. 7, 14, 21-23; 
Freidson, 1986, pp. 63-64, 70, 186, 210, 225-226; Abbott, 1988, 
pp. 1-2, 5-9, 323].3 Rules of Professional Ethics or Conduct, 
embodying public service as an ideal, not only serve as an al-
leged standard of practice, but also contribute in achieving so-
cial credibility and public confidence [Cerf, 1970, p. 45; Larson, 
1977, p. 58-59; Lubell, 1980, p. 42]. Casler [1964, p. iii] states 
that a code of ethics provides a signal that a given occupation is 
evolving into an established profession. While the development 
of abstract specialized knowledge and Rules of Conduct create 
a mystique that legitimizes professional work and claims to 
prestige, Abbott [1988, pp. 2, 5, 136] maintains that both are 
used by professions to defend against attacks from other occu-
3Freidson [1986, p. 63] describes credentials as items that provide informa-
tion regarding the ability of a worker. Examples are professional certification 
and licenses. Closure refers to the ability of a profession to exclude unwanted 
ou t s ide r s in o rde r to achieve g roup social s t a tus and marke t con t ro l 
[Macdonald, 1985, p . 541]. 
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pations in a highly competitive market for provided services. 
The resolution of territorial disputes over market domain is the 
p r imary factor de termining the evolution of a profession 
[Abbott, 1988, p. 2]. 
Abbott [1988, pp. 2-3, 18-20, 325] suggests that research 
should examine how market control of professional services, 
especially that of accounting, has developed and how conflict 
over providing those services has impacted practitioners. We 
suspect that competition for the control of accounting services 
may have impeded some practicing accountants from adhering 
to certain Rules of Conduct, especially those concerning com-
petitive behavior. The following sections discuss the evolution 
of the Rules of Conduct in Texas and observed data regarding 
the enforcement of such Rules from 1946 through 1978, then 
concludes with an application of Abbott's [1988, pp. 2-3] theory 
to the results. 
HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION IN TEXAS: 
1896-1979 
Freidson [1986, p. 30-31, 37], Lubell [1980, p . 39], and 
Caplow [1966, pp. 21] assert that professions emerge through 
t ime. In 1896, when the first U.S. CPA law was passed 
[Edwards, 1960, pp. 68-69; Previts and Merino, 1979, p . 97-98], 
the public accounting profession in Texas was just emerging 
[Tinsley, Undated, p. 1].4 Texas did not introduce credentialism 
until the enactment of the initial Public Accountancy Act in 
1915.5 This legislation provided legal recognition of the profes-
sion and established a governor-appointed Texas State Board of 
Public Accountancy. 
In accord with the national Progressive Reform movement 
of the early 1900s and in response to local business scandals, 
Texas practitioners organized themselves to become politically 
active in 1911 through the Texas Society of Public Accountants 
[Tinsley, 1962, p. 17]. This small group of practitioners, which 
became the predecessor of the Texas Society of Certified Public 
Accountants (TSCPA), served as the primary originator and 
4Practitioners first opened offices in Fort Worth and Galveston, with other 
accounting firms appearing in numerous Texas cities, including Dallas, San 
Antonio, Houston, and El Paso, during the next decade [Tinsley, Undate, p . 1]. 
5Although Texas was far behind New York in legislating certification of 
public accountants, it was not among the last states to establish legal creden-
tials. 
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proponent of all professional legislation [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 
1, 10; Tinsley, 1962, pp. x, 17].6 An important factor in under-
standing the regulation of the accounting profession in Texas is 
the circuitous and close relationship between the Board and the 
TSCPA. Such mutually supportive affiliations are not unusual 
in Texas politics. Anderson et al. [1989, p. 95] maintain that 
most of the Texas boards or commissions "have been 'captured' 
by the industry they are supposed to regulate." 
Three aspects of Texas political history demonstrate why 
special interest groups, such as the public accounting profes-
sion, were able to initiate Texas legislation in their self inter-
ests. First, Texas political culture embodied the Social Darwin-
ism and conservative entrepreneurism of its populace, who not 
only disliked, but distrusted, government [Kraemer and Newell, 
1987, p. 27; Anderson et al, p. 35]. Second, Texas legislators, 
historically possessing relatively low levels of expertise and staff 
resources, had to rely on external sources for information and 
direction in writing bills [Kraemer and Newell, 1987, p. 116; 
Benton, 1972. p. 125]. Third, weak lobbying control laws en-
abled homogeneous interest factions to mobilize and produce 
legislative change [Anderson et al., 1989, p . 87; Benton, 1972, p . 
125]. The authors suggest that the TSCPA expanded over the 
years to become a cohesive force that not only could provide 
requisite technical information and expertise to a legislature 
with limited knowledge regarding accounting issues, but, as 
was characterist ic of other established business groups in 
Texas, also could design and promote legislation that protected 
their interests [Anderson et al., 1989, pp. 82, 87; Kraemer and 
Newell, 1987, p. 116]. 
The 1915 Act was weak, as was true with most initial CPA 
legislation throughout the country, in ensuring competence and 
in restricting the practice of public accounting [Edwards, 1960, 
pp. 110-114; Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 144, 147; Tinsley, 
Undated, p. 2]. Protection of occupational jurisdiction was at a 
minimum. Although some licensing of occupations occurred in 
Texas after 1905, many legislators, typical of those in southern 
6Throughout the United States, state professional societies and individual 
representatives of the profession often drafted the certification bills passed by 
state legislatures [Previts and Merino, 1979, pp. 103, 139-142; Lubell, 1980, p. 
390]. The Minutes of the State Board meeting January 31, 1953, provide evi-
dence that the Board was not authorized by the State "to concern itself with 
public accountancy legislation." 
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and midwestern states, were antagonistic to restricting work to 
those who held permits to practice an occupation. Professional 
societies in many states considered themselves fortunate to ob-
tain any CPA laws, however weak [Previts and Merino, 1979, p . 
146; Tinsley, Undated, p. 1]. The purpose of the Texas law was 
to provide for a testing and certification process to indicate 
competence, not to regulate accounting practice throughout the 
state [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 2, 16]. Although the Act permitted 
certificate revocation for felonies and acts discreditable, it did 
not empower the Board to directly seek out and punish viola-
tors or promulgate rules of conduct [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 2, 
16]. 
Evolution of Professional Regulation From 1915 to the 1945 Act 
By 1924 all states and territories had passed some form of 
certification laws governing their membership [Edwards, 1960, 
pp. 219-220, 302; Previts and Merino, 1979, p . 100].7 Whereas in 
the early 1900s, stigmatizing "acts discreditable" was the pri-
mary method of assuring professional competence, the profes-
sion during the 1920s avowed that formal knowledge as the key 
to expertise [Previts and Merino, 1979 pp. 149, 152, 160, 213-
215]. During the 1920s and 1930s the training of accountants 
often included education at universities [Edwards, 1960, pp. 
135-136, 179; Previts and Merino, 1979, pp. 213-215].8 Although 
the 1915 Act did not address educational requirements, as did 
CPA laws in states that required a high school degree or its 
equivalent, the TSCPA during the 1920s supported a university 
education through prizes for theses and assistance for gradu-
ates in obtaining jobs [Tinsley, 1962, p . 33; Previts and Merino, 
1979, p . 152].9 Lack of even a high school educational require-
7By 1956 only 32 states had "legally enforceable" rules of conduct [Carey, 
1956, p . 10]. 
8By 1930 over 300 colleges offered a baccalaureate degree (B.A.) in ac-
counting [Previts and Merino, 1979, p . 213]. 
9Populist sentiment against CPA legislation, particularly in the Midwest 
and South resulted in a variety of admission requirements leading to diverse 
levels of expertise and quality of performance [Previts and Merino, p. 146]. A 
review of the Board Minutes for meetings during the 1920s and 1930s reveals 
that reciprocity of certification between states, not misconduct, was the pre-
vailing issue being debated in Texas [Minutes, November 16-17, 1920, May 22, 
1927, August 20, 1927, December 20, 1933, July 6, 1936, May 17, 1939, October 
9, 1939, August 13, 1940]. Inferior certificates devalued certificates of qualified 
holders who had passed the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) exam and 
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ment in the 1915 Act was not surprising, given the anti-regula-
tory climate. 
Ensuring technical competence was not the only concern of 
the accounting profession. While the progressive reform move-
ment raised some serious questions regarding unrestra ined 
competition, by the 1920s politicians condemned cut throat 
competition" [Previts and Merino, 1979, pp. 128, 209]. The 
changing political environment forced the public accounting 
profession to brand practitioner competition as being in con-
flict with the public good. Accounting leaders argued that dif-
ferentiating the profession from commercial activities was 
paramount to enhancing the image of "professional attitude" 
and public confidence in the profession [Richardson, 1931, pp. 
48-49, 60-63; Carey, 1956, p. 56; Yerkes, 1975, p. 6, 8-10]. Dur-
ing the 1920s, under pressure from the U.S. Treasury, the AIA 
addressed two ethical issues perceived as not being in the pub-
lic interest, contingent fees and advertising, banning both prac-
tices as inconsistent with professional conduct [Previts and Me-
rino, 1979, pp. 209-213]. 
Competitive behavior among practitioners also was a con-
cern of the TSCPA during the 1920s. Major problems included 
open solicitation of clients by both local and national firms, 
competitive bidding, and advertising [Tinsley, 1962, p . 30]. De-
spite national and local concern over the detriment that overt 
compet i t ion could bring to the profession, no prohibi t ion 
against professional competitive behavior existed in Texas regu-
lation. The 1915 Act did not enable the Board to establish Rules 
of Professional Conduct, even those that might have addressed 
competitive behavior issues. Two Texas incidents of inappropri-
ate audit report signatures and other "acts discreditable" in-
duced both TSCPA and Board action [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 16-
18]. The TSCPA adop ted a Code in 1929 tha t not only 
denounced acts of gross negligence in financial reporting, but 
prohibited advertising, commissions, contingent fees, and so-
licitation [Tinsley, Undated, p . 18; Tinsley, 1962, p . 30]. 
In 1932 the Board, despite the lack of statutory authority, 
asserted its prerogative and drafted its own Rules of Conduct. 
The initial Rules, emphasized professional integrity and identi-
fied two forms of misconduct: misrepresentation in audit re-
ports and engaging simultaneously in inconsistent occupations. 
followed state professional standards [Tinsley, Undated, p. 16; Tinsley, 1962, 
pp. 5, 29]. 
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The Board, assuming a moderate position in regulation, de-
clined to address advertising or solicitation [Tinsley, Undated, 
p. 18].10 
By 1939, the TSCPA had revised its own 1929 Code of Eth-
ics. Debate persisted about retaining rules against contingency 
fees, but the major issue of contention was competitive bidding, 
which many Texas practitioners perceived as part of normal 
business [Tinsley, 1962, pp. 43-44]. Although the AIA had pro-
posed banning the practice as impairing professional integrity 
and being contrary to the public interest , conflict among 
TSCPA members prevented the Texas Society from banning 
competitive bidding [Tinsley, 1962, p. 44; Carey, 1970, p. 244]. 
Jurisdictional disputes over provided services was no more 
clearly evident than in the conflict that existed between two 
competitive groups of accountants: the non-certified and the 
certified public accountants. Lubell [1980, pp. 45-46, 55, 96-97, 
368] discusses the conflict between CPAs and PAs as being both 
internal and external. The National Society of Public Accoun-
tants (NSPA) claimed that PAs were part of the public account-
ing domain. The AICPA maintained that only CPAs were mem-
bers of the profession of public accounting. PAs performed 
services similar to those of the CPAs [Edwards, 1960, p. 174; 
Lubell, 1980, p. 146], and in 1946, outnumbered certified ac-
countants by a ratio of three to one [Tinsley, Undated, p. 27].11 
Eventually PAs, in Texas and other states licensing non-certi-
fied accountants, became a dying class of accountants because 
restrictive legislation provided a one-time only opportunity for 
registration. Such legislation closed the profession in the future 
to anyone who had not passed the CPA examination and was 
not a CPA [Edwards, 1960, p. 176; Lubell, 1980, pp. 2, 6].12 
10Tinsley [Undated, p. 16] notes that in 1935 the AIA was opposed to state 
boards issuing rules of conduct prohibiting competitive behavior for fear the 
rules would be construed by the public as benefitting the profession. 
11
 The authors do not intend to resolve the dispute of whether PAs were 
internal or external to the public accounting profession. Although performing 
the same services and initially perceiving themselves as part of the same pro-
fession as their CPA counterparts [Lubell, 1980, p. 96], they evolved during the 
period under study into an external, dying class of practitioners. Our study 
examines violations of all registered accountants from 1945 through 1978 and 
treats this second tier of accountants as intraprofessional. 
12Despite the significant influence of the TSCPA on the Board, the Texas 
Association of Public Accountants (TAPA) was successful in obtaining legisla-
tion in 1951 that permitted PAs to be appointed to the Board from 1951 until 
8
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Promotion of legislation permitting a two-tiered profession, 
became the most important issue of the TSCPA from 1927 to 
1931 [Tinsley, 1962, p. 34]. Some Society members in Texas, as 
well as some CPAs throughout the country, perceived PA regis-
tration as demeaning the credentials belonging to the certified 
pract i t ioners and confusing to the public. These members 
sought to invalidate the second-class registration [Tinsley, 1962, 
pp. 34, 56; Lubell, 1980, pp. 18, 160, 388]. In addition, lack of 
support from the AIA, and later the AICPA, who argued against 
strong registrat ion laws, weakened the Society's efforts to 
achieve licensing for non-certified public accountants until 
1945 [Tinsley, Undated, p. 20]. 
Promulgation of laws to curb competitive behavior was not 
the only issue before the Board during the 1920s and the 1930s 
[Tinsley, Undated, pp. 14-20]. Frequent discussion at Board 
meetings concerned the inability to prosecute violators of exist-
ing standards. The Depression brought lapses in payments of 
dues to the Society and permit fees to the Board [Minutes, June 
24, 1938, August 13, 1940]. Inadequate funding and legal au-
thority left the Board impotent. Corrective actions consisted 
mostly of written notification of infractions, frequently fol-
lowed by the voluntary compliance of practitioners.13 Lack of 
meaningful enforcement, competitive behavior between firms 
and practitioners, and, most of all, TSCPA support of a two-
tiered profession to stipulate practitioner jurisdiction brought 
increased professional regulation beginning with the 1945 Act. 
1975. Lubell [1980, pp. 22] notes that as a result of legislative compromise 
numerous state PA societies succeeded in placing PAs on state accountancy 
boards. The three objectives of the NASPA were: equal representation of PAs 
on state boards, initial registration to grandfather-in PAs, and perpetuity for 
the second class of accountants through examination [Lubell, 1980, p. 79]. The 
ratio of PAs to CPAs sitting on the Texas Board averaged 44% until 1975. From 
1975 through 1981 two sitting PA Board members were permitted to complete 
their terms making the percentage of PAs to CPAs 22%. For a limited twenty-
four years this second tier of professionals possessed sufficient power to not 
only share in but also influence the decision-making process regarding the 
promulgation of rules and the enforcement of such rules [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 
24, 30-32, 42, 45, 80-85; Tinsley, 1962, pp. 70-71]. 
13Board Minutes November 24, 1939, rationalized the sufficiency of written 
infraction notifications by reasoning that most violations were due to practitio-
ner ignorance of the law rather than intent to disobey standards. 
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The 1945 Act and Accompanying Rules of Conduct 
Whereas the 1915 Act did not overtly restrict accounting 
practice to licensed practitioners, the 1945 Act explicitly pro-
hibited the practice of public accounting without a state permit. 
The Act defined both the "Practice of Public Accounting" as 
well as use of the term "Public Accountant" by practitioners 
and delineated practitioners as either CPAs or PAs. The one-
time registration of existing PA practitioners lasted for two 
years with only a few isolated cases of grandfathering occurring 
after 1947 [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 21-22]. The Texas profession 
had clearly established its domain of services offered to the 
public. 
The 1945 Act provided similar education and work experi-
ence standards for PAs and CPAs. Both groups of practitioners 
could employ various combinations of college and on-the-job 
training to prepare themselves for their careers. The major dif-
ference in admission requirements between the PAs and the 
CPAs was that CPA applicants were required to pass a rigorous 
exam, which became the delineating factor and signal for ex-
pertise. Retention standards were also different. Unlike CPAs, 
failure of PAs to annually renew the state occupational permit 
brought loss of the right to practice. Such restrictions on prac-
tice ensured that non-certified practitioners would become a 
perishing class.14 
The 1945 Act also legitimized efforts of the Board to pro-
mulgate rules of professional conduct viewed as requisite in 
establishing professional integrity and in preventing competi-
tive behavior. In July 1946, the Board adopted sixteen Rules of 
Professional Conduct to accompany the new Act in regulating 
the profession. These Rules prohibited solicitation, advertising, 
and competitive bidding. They also provided evidence of the 
profession's increasing cognizance of misconduct by defining 
acts of gross negligence and, for the first time, introduced the 
issue of auditor independence.15 
14The Board often illegally delayed acceptance of fee payment as a means 
to discipline PA Rule violators [Tinsley, Undated, p. 29]. Permit records at the 
offices of the Texas State Board indicate that only 40 registered non-certified 
accountants remain in practice today. 
15The Rules banned examiners from owning a substantial financial interest 
in any enterprise on which they expressed an opinion regarding the financial 
statements. 
10
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Enforcement of the 1945 Act and 1946 Rules of Conduct 
Enforcement of the 1945 Act and Rules of Conduct was as 
problematic as the efforts to generate the regulations. During 
the 1940s and the 1950s, the Board could not independently 
initiate legal proceedings to suspend or revoke permits of viola-
tors without the cooperation of the Texas Attorney General. 
Lack of adequate funding also limited the pursuit of violators of 
the Act and Rules.16 
Despite legal and monetary constraints, Minutes [January 
20, 1951, April 7, 1951, June 10, 1951, September 21, 1951, 
October 20, 1951, March 29, 1952, January 2, 1954, January 22, 
1955, July 15, 1957, March 24, 1958, March 8, 1961] reveal that 
the Board assumed a proactive stance in investigating and sanc-
tioning violations. Written and verbal complaints received from 
other practitioners and the TSCPA provided the basis for most 
investigations into alleged violations [Tinsley, Undated, pp. 28, 
36; Tinsley, 1962, p. 71; Tinsley, 1983, p. 31].. As late as January 
30, 1961, Board Minutes disclose that accountants accused of 
lesser infractions were reprimanded by the Board as a whole or 
by individual Board members. Cases concerning substandard 
practice were directed to the Attorney General for court action. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, lack of enforcement was 
a serious concern of both the TSCPA and the Board [Tinsley, 
1962, pp. 72, 81; Minutes, August 8, 1952, October 18. 1952, 
September 10, 1954, May 25, 1959, March 8, 1961]. Evidence of 
substandard audits of insurance companies by Society mem-
bers led the TSCPA to conclude that lack of knowledge or an 
unwillingness to meet professional standards was the at the 
root of malpractice [Tinsley, 1962, p. 81]. Practitioner intent 
became recognized by the profession as a possible factor in the 
incidence of violations. Amendments to Board Rules in 1959 
addressed some TSCPA concerns by enhancing the integrity of 
audit opinions and empowering the Board directly to institute 
proceedings against accountants convicted of felonies or profes-
sional misconduct. Prior to this time, the 1945 Act, unlike the 
Act of 1915, did not specifically list felonies as one of the 
charges subject to revocation or suspension. 
l6Minutes [September 18, 1959] reveal that the Board's cash balance in-
creased unti l 1959 when rising administrat ive costs eroded the cushion. 
Tinsley [Undated, pp. 27, 47] reveals that by 1978 the Board was in a deficit 
situation with examination costs making up 67.9% of total expenditures and 
enforcement only 4.8%. 
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Board Minutes for an August 1, 1960, meeting indicate that 
for the first time, the State Board became proactive in recom-
mending that the Texas legislature promote TSCPA sponsored 
regulation to enhance Board enforcement power. In a 1961 
amendment to the Act, the Board finally received the power to 
subpoena evidence and directly discipline violators through cer-
tificate revocation or suspension.17 The Board immediately be-
gan employing its new power. The number of meetings in-
creased from approximately eight to ten a year in the 1950s to 
fifteen in 1962 [Minutes, 1950-1962].18 
Continued Need for Professional Reform 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, national and state criti-
cism continued to mount against public accountants due to the 
perceived failure of the profession to curb work that neither 
complied with standards nor met public expectations [Tinsley, 
1983, pp. 97, 121, 123; Previts and Merino, 1979, pp. 316-324]. 
The image of "professional attitude" was once again revisited 
and found lacking. TSCPA concern over auditor responsibility 
to the public corresponded to national concerns and spurred 
the Society to take steps during the late 1970s to support legis-
lative reform [Tinsley, 1983, pp. 143-145]. 
Concurrent with the debate pertaining to professional in-
tegrity, competence, and competition, rules of conduct were 
challenged by government at the national level. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) attacked rules banning advertising, 
solicitation and competitive bidding, as providing evidence of 
professional price fixing and being contrary to the public inter-
est. The U.S. Justice Department filed suit against both the 
Texas State Board and the TSCPA in 1977, alleging that Rule 14 
on competitive bidding restricted price competition [Tinsley, 
1983, pp. 133-137].19 The TSCPA had neither the political clout 
nor the financial means to fight the U.S. Justice Department. 
17The 1961 amendment also altered the substance of certification from a 
restrictive license to practice public accounting to a registered title for quali-
fied practitioners. Competence continued to be an issue as educational and 
experience requirements for certification also were strengthened. 
18The authors made a count of Board meetings per year during the period 
1950-1962 by examining the books of Minutes. 
19The major concern of the Board during the 1970s was the definition and 
regulation of competitive bidding. Minutes [February 3, 1964, April 23, 1968, 
February 5, 1972] disclose that competitive bidding on government contracts 
had been a concern starting in 1964 and continued to consume much of the 
Board's time throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Ultimately, the Texas Sunset Act of 1977, which called for a 
systematic review of all state agencies, induced passage of a 
new Act [Tinsley, 1983, pp. 149-153; Kraemer and Newell, 1987, 
pp. 253-255; Anderson et al., 1989, pp. 222-225]. If an agency or 
board did not pass review, it ceased to exist. The Sunset Advi-
sory Commission urged Board independence from the licensees 
it governed, and questioned current rules on advertising, solici-
tation, and competitive bidding as not being in the public inter-
est. The Commission also noted the lack of mandated continu-
ing education requirements for Texas professionals. The Texas 
State Board of Public Accountancy, finding itself in the position 
of having to justify its existence to the Commission by Septem-
ber 1, 1979, worked with the TSCPA to launch professional 
reform through new legislative activity and by promulgating 
new Rules of Professional Conduct. 
During the period that the 1945 Act and accompanying 
Board Rules were in effect, the Texas accounting profession 
evolved similarly to that in the rest of the country. Despite the 
rhetoric of the TSCPA and Board efforts to ensure competence 
through the enforcement of higher admission standards, sub-
standard audits and accounting practice continued to be a ma-
jor concern of both the public and the government. The regula-
tory history of the accounting profession generates several 
issues regarding enforcement. Specifically, was enforcement ac-
tivity responsive to public concern or was it more enmeshed in 
professional efforts to preserve status and competitive position? 
The following section describes how this study examines these 
issues. 
HYPOTHESES 
The evolution of the accounting profession during the pe-
riod covered by the 1945 Act and its emerging regulation sug-
gests several hypotheses. First, the history of the Texas account-
ing profession and the conflict therein during the period under 
study suggests that PAs and CPAs differed demographically in 
terms of education, type of training, and form of practice. We 
further posit that certain demographic characteristics might be 
linked to increased vulnerability to Rules violations. 
Throughout this period, professional preparation involved 
formal education and/or on-the-job training. The profession 
maintained that increased formal education and more rigorous 
on-the-job training would provide a stronger background for 
public accounting practice, and thus enhance an individual's 
13
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likelihood of passing the exam required to become a certified 
public accountant. Yerkes [1975, pp. 80, 98-99, 101,102, 104, 
137-139, 150] found differences in both education and training 
between CPAs and PAs, as well as differential attitudes toward 
professional ethical standards. Therefore, we posit that less 
education and/or more localized training would increase the 
likelihood that a given practitioner would violate a rule. 
Certain forms of practice also might make the accountant 
more vulnerable to Rules violation. Cook [1962, p. 238] found 
that larger and national firms provided more unconditional 
support for professional ethical standards than smaller and lo-
cal firms. Loeb [1971, p . 290] noted, while compiling his 
sample of CPAs for a study of ethics, that all the CPAs who had 
been sanctioned were members of small local firms or indi-
vidual practitioners. In addition, practitioners in larger CPA of-
fices expressed more disapproval of a number of unethical be-
haviors than those in small offices [Loeb, 1971, pp. 297, 305]. 
In addition, Schaefer and Welker [1974, pp. 113-114] observed 
more violations in small firms. Large national firms should 
have the shared expertise which would enable their profession-
als to better avoid technical errors than small, local practices. 
However, such firms might be viewed as being more overtly 
competitive by other accountants, and thus more prone to re-
ported competitive violations. For purposes of this study, we 
refer to those professionals called before Board hearings for 
Rules violations as "violators," and to those professionals not 
subject to Board hearings for Rules violations as "nonviolators." 
The above demographic characteristics are reflected in the 
first two hypotheses. 
H1: During the period 1946 through 1978, the demographics 
of CPAs and PAs differed. 
H2: During the period 1946 through 1978, the demographics 
of violators and non-violators of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct associated with the Act differed. 
The history of the Texas profession indicates that, during 
the period 1946 through 1978, PAs were in conflict with CPAs 
for provision of accounting services. Yerkes [1975, p. 294] 
found evidence of less internalization of professional ethics 
among PAs than among national CPAs. Comments from one 
non-certified accountant indicate that those PAs being disci-
plined by the board believed that this second tier of accoun-
tants had been singled out for attention [Cornell Deposition, 
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1960, p. 20]. However, some certified practitioners argued that 
PAs lacked technical expertise, which may have led to more PA 
violations. This conflict lead to the proposal of our third hy-
pothesis. 
H3: During the period 1946 through 1978, enforcement activ-
ity, violation citations and sanctions, would be greater 
for PAs than for CPAs. 
Public criticism of accounting practice and professional 
concern over preservation of integrity [Tinsley, 1983, pp. 121-
123] reflects reaction to behavior considered injurious to the 
client and public. Violations perceived to cause such ha rm 
should have resulted in more severe sanctions. We categorize 
punishments which withdraw the practitioner's right to practice, 
i.e., revocation of the certificate and revocation of the permit, as 
severe sanctions.20 Loeb [1972, p. 6] and Tidrick [1992, p. 171] 
found evidence of a link between the seriousness of the violation 
and the severity of the sanction. Conversely, competitive behav-
ior violations, which impair intraprofessional relationships, 
while subject to vigorous enforcement, should result in less pu-
nitive sanctions. This belief is expressed in Hypothesis 4. 
H4: During the period 1946 through 1978, violations related 
to integrity and practice issues would trigger more severe 
sanctions than violations related to competitive issues. 
Our study subdivides the interval during which the 1945 
Act was in effect into two periods to examine hypothesized 
trends regarding violations and punishments. During the first 
period, from 1946 through 1961, the Board possessed minimal 
enforcement power. Two events occurred which contributed to 
the expectation that there would be more enforcement activity 
in the second period, from 1962 through 1978. First, in 1959, 
four new Rules were added, including Rule 19 that permitted 
the Board to institute sanctions for felony convictions.21 Sec-
ond, in 1961, an amendment to the 1945 Act gave the Board 
legal power to enforce rules without the aid of the Texas Attor-
20Both CPAs and PAs received permits, but only CPAs received certificates. 
Because PAs did not receive certificates, revocation of certificate could apply 
only to CPAs. 
21Before the 1945 Act, although specific disciplinary authority regarding 
felonies was lacking, certificates were revoked for felony convictions, including 
draft evasion during World War II [Records, 1942]. From 1946 to 1959, three 
practitioners were cited for felonies, before adoption of Rule 19 [Records, 
1951, 1956, 1961]. 
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ney General. Thus, enforcement activity during this period was 
expected to exceed that of the first period. These changes lead 
to Hypothesis 5a and 5b. 
H5a: Enforcement activity increased following the 1961 statu-
tory change allowing the Board autonomous enforce-
ment in terms of the number of citations for violations. 
H5b: Enforcement activity increased following the 1961 statu-
tory change allowing the Board autonomous enforce-
ment in terms of the number and severity of sanctions. 
Next we discuss the methodology used to test these hypotheses. 
METHODOLOGY 
Several sources provided information for our study. We ob-
tained enforcement data from available files of the Texas State 
Board of Public Accountancy. Tinsley [Undated, pp. 27, 45] of-
fered details regarding the numbers of actual practitioners. 
The records of formal hearings conducted during this time 
provided information regarding the nature of the offense(s) 
which triggered the formal hearing(s), the Rule(s) violated, and 
the action(s) taken by the Board to resolve the problem(s).22 
Records of hearings, as well as the computerized and micro-
fiche records of individuals subjected to hearings offered demo-
graphic information.23 In addition to records of violators, a ran-
dom sample of non-violating CPAs and PAs was drawn to test 
for hypothesized differences. We first compared demographic 
characteristics between non-violating CPAs and PAs, and then 
compared violator attributes with those free from Board cita-
tions to see if they differed. While the State Board did not 
maintain continuous records tracking the number of active 
2 20ne complaint regarding an alleged violation often triggered multiple 
hearings, due to postponements, prolonged communicat ion processes, etc. If 
there were multiple hearings for one event, a large proportion of the hearings 
involved the rescheduling of the practitioner's appearance for another hearing. 
This study employs one hearing, the earliest recorded, per complaint event. 
Also, one hearing could entail violation of more than one rule. 
23Attribute testing, with a tolerable error rate of 5%, was performed on a 
random sample of 231 CPAs and PAs practicing during the same period as the 
violators to determine if the file of formal hearings was complete. Results, one 
omission, indicated an upper occurrence limit of 2.4%, well below the tolerable 
error rate. The hearings file was determined to be substantially complete and 
representative of the practitioner population. The authors additionally relied 
on the random sample for demographic information representative of the 
population of CPAs and PAs as a whole. 
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practitioners during the period under study, we were able to 
obtain useful data from Tinsley [Undated, p. 27]. During the 
period under study, the largest number of active permits for 
PAs was 3,942 in 1947. The number of PAs with permits had 
fallen to 2,112 by 1965, 1,670 by 1970, and 923 by 1979 
[Tinsley, Undated, p. 45]. In the same years, the number of 
permits issued to CPAs was 1,116, 6,414, 8,635, and 19,533, 
respectively, [Tinsley, Undated, p. 45]. 
The application to either take the CPA exam or to receive a 
practice permit provided information about both education and 
training. We assigned individuals to one of four educational 
groups according to the highest level completed: college degree, 
some college training, technical training or correspondence 
courses, and high school. The forms also indicated whether the 
individual obtained on-the-job training from Big Eight CPA 
firms, local CPA firms, companies, governmental entities, or a 
university. The permit applications or renewals, or correspon-
dence often indicated whether the professional worked as an 
accountant for a Big Eight CPA firm, a local partnership, a 
corporation, or the government; or was a sole practitioner or a 
professor. 
All Minutes of both the hearings and other Board meetings 
were read to gain further insight into the enforcement process. 
The hearings records identified both the specific Rule(s) broken 
by the violator and provided a description of the activity that 
triggered the complaint. 
Several sources, addressing professional ethics, employ dif-
ferent models for classifying rules of conduct [Carey, 1956, p . 
xi; AICPA 1962 Code, in Casler, 1964, pp. 122-127; Casler, 1964, 
p. iii; Loeb, 1971, p. 289]. Each utilizes its own terminology and 
classification system. We grouped the Rules in effect from 1946 
through 1978 into three categories: integrity, practice, and com-
petition. The categories and labels are based on a combination 
of the models found in Exhibit 1, which we merged to better 
represent the spirit of the Texas Rules in ensuring integrity, in 
promoting practice competence and responsibility, and in regu-
lating competitive behavior among colleagues.24 
24Although Loeb [1971, pp. 302-303] also categorizes rules of conduct into 
three groupings, public, client, and colleague, that article does not incorporate 
many of the rules that are included in this study. We found the models of 
Carey [1956], the AICPA 1962 Code, and Casler [1962] usually more appropri-
ate for our purposes because they encompassed most of the rules analyzed in 
this paper. 
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TABLE 1 
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct 
in Effect During Term of 1945 Act 
(1946-1978) 
Integrity 
Rule 8 A public accountant may not accept contingent fees except in 
cases where the fee was determined by the findings of a court or 
administrative body. (CONTINGT)* 
Rule 12 A public accountant may not express his opinion on the financial 
statements in which he had a beneficial interest. (FINTRST) 
Rule 13 A public accountant may not affiliate with any school that con-
ducts its operations in a manner discreditable to the profession. 
(SCHOOL) 
Rule 18^ A public accountant may not allow his name to be associated with 
financial statements in such a manner as to imply he was acting 
as an independent accountant when he was not. (NONINDPT) 
Rule 19^ A public accountant convicted of a felony or offense involving 
mora l t u r p i t u d e is also guil ty of profess iona l m i sconduc t . 
(FELONY) 
Practice 
Rule 4 A public accountant may not be grossly negligent in disclosing 
material facts and applying generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. (NEGLECT) 
Rule 5 A public accountant may not sign a report unless reviewed by 
himself or an employee. (SIGNREVW) 
Rule 10 A public accountant may not practice under a corporate charter 
unless authorized to do so before 1945. (CORP) 
Rule 11 A public accountant may not permit his name to be used in con-
junction with estimates of future earnings that seem to vouch for 
the accuracy of a forecast. (FORECAST) 
Rule 16 A public accountant may not violate the confidential relationship 
between himself and his client. (CONFIDE) 
Rule 17^ A public accountant may not allow an employee to perform ser-
vices which the accoun tan t was not pe rmi t t ed to per form. 
(EMPSVCS) 
Competition 
Rule 1 A public accountant may not allow any person to practice in his 
name unless a par tner or employee. (PRACNAME) 
Rule 2 A public accountant may not pay or receive commissions from the 
laity. (COMMISS) 
Rule 3 A public accountant may not engage in a business incompatible 
with his practice. (INCOMPAT) 
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct 
in Effect During Term of 1945 Act 
(1946-1978) 
Rule 6 A public accountant may not solicit clients or encroach upon the 
practice of another accountant. (SOLICIT) 
Rule 7 A public accountant may not offer employment to an accountant 
employed by a n o t h e r wi thou t first notifying the employer . 
(STEALEMP) 
Rule 9** A public accountant may not advertise. (ADVERT) 
Rule 14** A public accountant may not make a competitive bid for profes-
sional engagements. (COMPETE) 
Rule 15 A public accountant may not be immune from these rules when 
engaged simultaneously in the practice of another occupation. 
(OTHROCCU) 
Rule 20^ A public accountant may not use certain descriptive designations, 
such as "Tax Accountant," "Head of Audit Section," "Business 
Counseling," and "Business Engineering." (DESCRIBE) 
* Term in parentheses is descriptive variable name given to rule. 
** This rule was amended in 1978. 
^ This rule was added to the Code in 1959. 
Casler's [1964, pp. iii, 74] three categories, integrity, profes-
sional standards and responsibility, and professional attitude 
reflect the public accounting profession's concern regarding its 
obligations to the public, clients, and internally between mem-
bers. Integrity suggests that accountants should possess moral 
principles and avoid conflicting relationships with others in so-
ciety [Casler, 1964, pp. 6-7]. Casler's [1964, p. 7] integrity classi-
fication includes the topics of both Texas Rules 12 and 18 con-
cerning independence. Carey [1956, pp. 21, 33] also classified 
the content of these two Rules under integrity, and Loeb [1971, 
pp. 302-303] related them to a practitioner's obligation to the 
public. In concurrence with Carey [1956, p. 20] and Casler 
[1964, p . 7] our study labels Rules in this category as integrity. 
In agreement with Casler [1964, p. 28, 34], we include Rule 8 on 
contingency fees in this group. Our study also classifies Rule 
13, concerning affiliation with a discreditable school, and Rule 
19 on felony convictions in the integrity category since both 
involve morality issues and do not specifically relate to practice 
standards or competitive behavior. 
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Professional standards concern the practitioner's responsi-
bility to both client and society [Casler, 1964, p. 71]. This classi-
fication embodies Carey's practice and relations with clients 
groupings [1956, p . 46-57, 77, 82-93], the AICPA 1962 Code 
technical and operating classifications [in Casler, 1964, pp. 122-
127], and Loeb's client category [1971, p . 302]. Following 
Casler's model [1964, p. 45], we place Rules 4, 5, 10, 11, 16 and 
17 in this second category. We have chosen, however, to name 
this group practice, a more all-inclusive term encompassing 
both responsibility to clients and technical competence issues. 
Breach of these Rules indicated that the individual lacked the 
necessary knowledge or skill to perform the task, failed to exer-
cise due care, or disregarded the client's interests. 
Professional attitude includes rules that not only serve to 
preserve the collegiality and unity of the accounting profession, 
but more importantly condemn practice which is "incompatible 
with professional status" [Casler, 1964, p . 74]. Casler [1964, pp. 
112, 116] depicts them as efforts to control the competition 
between practitioners that is in conflict with the professional 
image of altruism. The connection of the rules to the collegial-
ity of the profession is also described by Carey [1956, pp. 50-83, 
184-195] as issues affecting both professional attitude and rela-
tions with fellow practitioners. Loeb [1971, p. 302-303] classi-
fies them as obligations to colleagues. Since colleague rules 
concern the competitive behavior of practitioners, we have rela-
beled this category competition to better relate the classifica-
tion to the theory of Abbott [1988, pp. 2-3]. Our competition 
category includes all Texas Rules (Rules 1, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, and 
20) found in Casler's [1964, pp. 80, 112-115] professional atti-
tude. In addition, we concur with the AICPA 1962 Code [in 
Casler, 1964, pp. 122-127] and Loeb [1971, p. 303] that Rule 2 
on commissions be placed in this category of competi t ion 
among colleagues. We also place Rule 3 on incompatible occu-
pations, which Loeb [1971, p. 302] describes as colleague type 
issues, in this category.25 The details of all 20 rules discussed in 
this paper are briefly summarized in Table 1. 
The hearings and microfiche records also provided infor-
mation regarding punishments. Sanctions were examined in 
25Casler [1964, pp. 80-81] includes "practice in the name of a member," 
Texas Rule 1, in his discussion of "Professional Attitude" because the intent of 
the AIA rule was to prevent CPAs from acting as fronts for non-certified public 
accountants, a collegue issue. 
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three respects. First, we tested for a relationship between the 
nature of the violations and severity of sanctions imposed. In 
addition, we compared punishments imposed on CPAs versus 
PAs for violation of the same rules. Lastly, we examined the 
trend of both violations reported and punishments meted out 
over time to determine if the nature of sanctions changed. 
We analyzed the data gathered through the use of descrip-
tive statistics. The analysis of nominative information was ac-
complished through the construction of contingency tables and 
the generation of Chi-square statistics. Univariate statistics and 
t-tests were calculated for the numeric data. 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 posited that during the period 1946 through 
1978, the demographics of CPAs and PAs differed. CPAs and 
PAs did differ along certain dimensions within every demo-
graphic characteristic, supporting this hypothesis. Table 2 pro-
vides a summary of these findings. 
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TABLE 2 
Demographic Comparisons Between Certified Public 
Accountants and Public Accountants Not Found to Have 
Violated the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct in Effect 
(1946 - 1978) 
Charac te r i s t i c 
Education (highest level attained)* 
Information availablex 
College degree 
Some college 
Technical/correspondence 
High school or less 
Type of Training* 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership/proprietorship 
Corporate accountant 
Government accountant (federal, 
state, or local) 
University academic 
Type of Practice* 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership 
Sole proprietorship 
Corporate accountant 
Government accountant (federal, 
state, or local 
University accounting educator 
Records did not provide information for 100% of n for the individual 
demographic categories. Percentage for information available is percent-
age of total n, not available n. 
Demographic category exhibits significant between CPAs and PAs at .05 
probability level. 
Individual category exhibits significant difference between CPAs and PAs 
at .05 probability level. 
CPAs 
(Total n = 173) 
n 
158 
146 
10 
2 
0 
151 
61 
44 
34 
7 
5 
73 
5 
7 
20 
32 
3 
6 
% of 
available n 
91.3 
92.4** 
6.3 
1.3 
0.0 
87.3 
40.4** 
29.1 
22.5 
4.7 
3.3 
42.2 
6.9 
9.6 
27.4 
43.8 
4.1 
8.2** 
PAs 
(Total n = 58) 
n 
58 
14 
19 
22 
3 
57 
5 
25 
15 
12 
0 
58 
1 
6 
20 
17 
14 
0 
% of 
available n 
100.0 
24.1 
32.7** 
37.9** 
5.3** 
98.3 
8.8 
43.8** 
26.3 
21.1** 
0.0 
100.0 
1.7 
10.3 
34.5 
29.3 
24.2** 
0.0 
The differences in both education and training obtained 
between the two groups were notable. Yerkes found similar 
differences [1975, pp. 80, 99]. PAs acquired significantly more 
training at the technical and high school level and earned sig-
x 
* 
** 
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nificantly fewer college degrees than CPAs. PAs received signifi-
cantly more training at the local firm level, and less than their 
certified counterparts at Big Eight CPA firms. Proportionally 
more PAs both trained with federal, state, or local government 
entities, and then continued to work in the government ac-
counting sector than did CPAs. Fewer PAs than CPAs worked 
for corporations. 
The second hypothesis stated that the demographics of vio-
lators and non-violators of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
associated with the Act differed. The comparison of the demo-
graphic character is t ics of the violating and non-violat ing 
groups yielded partial support for Hypothesis 2. Violating CPAs 
exhibited significantly different demographic characteristics 
from their non-violating counterparts. These differential char-
acteristics may reflect attitudinal differences found by both 
Cook [1963, p. 238] and Loeb [1971, pp. 297, 305]. Schaefer and 
Welker [1994, p. 113-114] found more violations among small 
firms. Table 3 provides information regarding these differences 
between the two CPA groups. Table 4, however, reveals that the 
demographic characteristics of PAs did not differ with respect 
to their violation status. 
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TABLE 3 
Demographic Comparisons Between Certified Public 
Accountant Violators and Nonviolators of the Texas Rules 
of Professional Conduct in Effect (1946 - 1978) 
Characteristic 
Education (highest level attained)* 
Information availablex 
College degree 
Some college 
Technical/correspondence 
High school or less 
Type of Training* 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership/proprietorship 
Corporate accountant 
Government accountant (federal, 
state, or local) 
University academic 
Type of Practice* 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership 
Sole proprietorship 
Corporate accountant (federal, 
state, or local) 
Government accountant 
University accounting educator 
Records did not provide information for 100% of n for the individual 
demographic categories. Percentage for information available is percent-
age of total n, not available n. 
Demographic category exhibits significant between violators and non-vio-
lators at .05 probability level. 
Individual category exhibits significant difference between violators and 
non-violators at .05 probability level. 
n 
53 
43 
5 
4 
1 
64 
12 
33 
16 
3 
0 
74 
8 
26 
33 
7 
0 
0 
Violators 
(n=88) 
% of 
available n 
60.2 
81.1 
9.4 
7.6** 
1.9** 
72.7 
18.7 
51.6** 
25.0 
4.7 
0.0 
84.1 
10.8 
35.1** 
44.6 
9.5 
0.0 
0.0 
n 
158 
146 
10 
2 
0 
151 
61 
44 
34 
7 
5 
73 
5 
7 
20 
32 
3 
6 
Nonviolators 
(n=173) 
% of 
available n 
91.3 
92.4 
6.3 
1.3 
0.0 
87.3 
40.4 
29.1 
22.5 
4.7 
3.3 
42.2 
6.8 
9.6 
27.4 
43.9 
4.1 
8.2 
x 
* 
** 
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TABLE 4 
Demographic Comparisons Between Public Accountants 
Violators and Nonviolators of the Texas Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in Effect (1946 - 1978) 
Characteristic 
Education (highest level attained)* 
Information availablex 
College degree 
Some college 
Technical/correspondence 
High school or less 
Type of Training 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership/proprietorship 
Corporate accountant 
Government accountant (federal, 
state, or local) 
University academic 
Type of Practice 
Information availablex 
Big Eight CPA firm 
Local partnership 
Sole proprietorship 
Corporate accountant 
Government accountant (federal, 
state, or local) 
University accounting educator 
n 
15 
3 
3 
6 
3 
8 
1 
4 
2 
1 
0 
6 
0 
1 
2 
2 
1 
0 
Violators 
(n=22) 
% of 
available n 
68.2 
20.0 
20.0 
40.0 
20.0 
36.4 
12.5 
50.0 
25.0 
12.5 
0.0 
27.3 
0.0 
16.7 
33.3 
33.3 
16.7 
0.0 
n 
58 
14 
19 
22 
3 
57 
5 
25 
15 
12 
0 
58 
1 
6 
20 
17 
14 
0 
Nonviolators 
(n=58) 
% of 
available n 
65.5 
24.1 
32.7 
37.9 
5.3 
98.3 
8.8 
43.8 
26.3 
21.1 
0.0 
100.0 
1.7 
10.3 
34.5 
29.3 
24.2 
0.0 
Records did not provide information for 100% of n for the individual 
demographic categories. Percentage for information available is percent-
age of total n, not available n. 
No significant differences were found in demographic characteristics at 
the .05 probability level, either as a whole, or individually between viola-
tors and non-violators. 
Increased technical knowledge, as evidenced by bo th 
greater education and better on-the-job training, were nega-
tively associated with illicit CPA behavior. The Board cited 
CPAs without a college education significantly more frequently 
for Rules violations than those with at least some college educa-
tion. Furthermore, CPAs who had trained under the tutelage of 
a Big Eight CPA firm triggered significantly fewer hearings 
x 
* 
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than did those who worked with a local partnership or indi-
vidual practitioner. 
Certain forms of practice also were linked significantly to 
hearings for CPAs. The CPA most likely to be cited by the State 
Board was the person employed by local partnerships, and the 
CPA least likely worked for a corporation or university. 
Violations 
Hypothesis 3 posited that during the period 1946 through 
1978, enforcement activity, hearings and sanctions, would be 
greater for PAs than for CPAs. Yerkes [1975, p. 294] found 
evidence of less internalization of professional ethics among 
PAs than among national CPAs. Table 5 reports the Rules viola-
tions, arranged by integrity, practice, and competition classifi-
cations. It also provides information regarding differences in 
violation incidents between CPAs and PAs. 
TABLE 5 
Violations of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Which Hearings Were Held (1946 - 1978) 
Classified by Type and Violator 
Total individuals 
Integrity Rules 
Variable Name 
CONTINGT 
FINTRST 
SCHOOL 
NONINDPT* 
FELONY 
Total 
Practice Rules 
Variable Name 
CONFIDE 
EMPSVCS 
CORP 
NEGLECT 
SIGNREVW* 
FORECAST 
Total 
Num-
ber of 
Viola-
tions 
2 
1 
0 
1 
17 
21 
0 
0 
0 
27 
0 
_ 0 
27 
CPAs 
88 
%of 
CPA 
Viola-
tions 
1.8 
0.9 
0.0 
0.9 
15.3 
18.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.3 
0.0 
0.0 
24.3 
%of 
Total 
Viola-
tions 
1.5 
0.7 
0.0 
0.7 
12.6 
15.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
20.0 
0.0 
0.0 
20.0 
Num-
ber 
Viola-
tions 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
8.3 
16.7 
25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
25.0 
4.2 
0.0 
29.2 
PAs 
22 
%of 
PA 
Viola-
tions 
0 
0 
0 
2 
4 
6 
0 
0 
0 
6 
1 
0 
7 
% of 
Total 
Viola-
tions 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.5 
3.0 
4.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.5 
0.7 
0.0 
5.1 
Total 
110x 
Num-
ber of 
Viola-
tions 
2 
1 
0 
3 
21 
27 
0 
0 
0 
33 
1 
0 
34 
% of 
Total 
Viola-
tions 
1.5 
0.7 
0.0 
2.2 
15.6 
20.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.5 
0.7 
0.0 
25.2 
27
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
Violations of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Which Hearings Were Held (1946 - 1978) 
Classified by Type and Violator 
CPAs PAs Total 
Num-
ber of 
Viola-
t ions 
Competition Rules 
Variable Name 
PRACNAME* 
OTHROCCU 
COMMISS* 
INCOMPAT 
SOLICIT 
STEALEMP 
ADVERT 
COMPETE 
DESCRIBE* 
Total 
0 
5 
0 
1 
26 
4 
14 
13 
0 
63 
% of 
CPA 
Viola-
t ions 
0.0 
4.5 
0.0 
0.9 
23.4 
3.6 
12.6 
11.7 
0.0 
56.8 
% of 
Total 
Viola-
t ions 
0.0 
3.7 
0.0 
0.7 
19.3 
3.0 
10.4 
9.7 
0.0 
46.8 
Num-
ber 
Viola-
t ions 
4.2 
0.0 
4.2 
0.0 
12.5 
0 .0 
12.5 
8.3 
4.2 
45.8 
% o f 
PA 
Viola-
t ions 
1 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
3 
2 
1 
11 
% of 
Total 
Viola-
t ions 
0.7 
0.0 
0.7 
0.0 
2.2 
0.0 
2.2 
1.5 
0.7 
8.0 
Num-
ber of 
Viola-
t ions 
1 
5 
1 
1 
29 
4 
17 
15 
1 
74 
% of 
Total 
Viola-
t ions 
0.7 
3.7 
0.7 
0.7 
21.5 
3.0 
12.6XX 
11.2 
0.7 
54.8 
Total Violations 111 100.0 82.2 100.0 24 17.8 135x 100.0 
x
 One individual may be cited for more than one rule violation. 
* Significantly more PAs than CPAs at .05 probability level.. 
xx
 One advertising violation not identified by type of professional. 
Hypothesis 3 received only limited support in terms of the 
number of violations cited. Overall, CPAs received more cita-
tions than PAs. Only in five instances of rarely cited Rules viola-
tions did the Board cite PAs for violating specific Rules propor-
t ional ly m o r e f requent ly t h a n CPAs. Compe t i t i on Rules 
violations accounted for over half of total citations, with the 
rest being split approximately equally between integrity and 
practice Rules violations. Citations were absent for five Rules, 
10 (form of practice), 11 (certifying forecast estimates), 13 (af-
filiation with a discreditable school), 16 (violating a client's 
confidentiality), and 17 (allowing an employee to perform ser-
vices for which the professional cannot perform). The discus-
sions of sanctions and enforcement periods below further ad-
dress the c o n t e n t i o n of Hypothes i s 3 r ega rd ing g rea t e r 
enforcement activity directed at PAs when compared to CPAs. 
The only demographic characteristic which significantly af-
fected the types of violations which occurred was the type of 
practice in which the CPA or PA was employed. Form of prac-
tice was identifiable in 80 of the hearing files. Table 6 reflects 
these results. 
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TABLE 6 
Violations for Which Hearings Were Held 
by Form of Practice (1946 - 1978) 
53 
Number 
% of Identified Practices 
Integrity Rules 
Variable Name 
CONTINGT 
FINTRST 
SCHOOL 
NONINDPT 
FELONY 
Total integrity 
violations 
% of integrity 
violations 
% of total violations 
Practice Rules 
Variable Name 
CONFIDE 
EMPSVCS 
CORP 
NEGLECT 
SIGNREVW 
FORECAST 
Total practice 
violations 
% of practice 
violations 
% of total violations 
Competition Rules 
Variable Name 
PRACNAME 
OTHROCCU 
COMMISS 
INCOMPAT 
SOLICIT 
STEALEMP 
ADVERT 
COMPETE 
DESCRIBE 
Total competition 
violations 
% of competition 
violations 
% of total violations 
Total Violations * 
% of total violations 
Big Eight 
CPA Firm 
8 
10.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
5.3 
0.9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
0 
3 
2 
0 
11 
17.5 
10.3 
12 
11.2 
Corporate 
9 
11.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
15.8 
2.8 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
8.0 
1.9 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
5 
7.9 
4.7 
10 
9.4 
All 
Government 
1 
1.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
5.3 
0.9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
0.9 
Local 
Firm 
27 
33.7 
1 
1 
0 
1 
5 
8 
42.1 
7.5 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
8 
32.0 
7.5 
0 
1 
0 
0 
9 
3 
3 
5 
0 
21 
33.3 
19.6 
37 
34.6 
Sole 
Practitioner 
35 
43.7 
1 
0 
0 
0 
5 
6 
31.5 
5.6 
0 
0 
0 
15 
0 
0 
15 
60.0 
14.0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
10 
1 
6 
6 
1 
26 
41.3 
24.3 
47 
43.9 
Total 
80 
100.0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
15 
19 
100.0 
17.7 
0 
0 
0 
25 
0 
0 
25 
100.0 
23.4 
0 
4 
0 
1 
25 
4 
14 
14 
1 
63 
100.0 
58.9 
107 
100.0 
Information regarding form of practice was missing from some violation 
data. 
* 
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Practitioners working in certain forms of practice were 
cited more frequently for the different types of violations than 
would have been expected, given their practice's representation 
among all identifiable forms. For instance, the nine corporate 
accountants (11.3% of the identified practices) accounted for 
15.8% of the violations of integrity Rules (all felonies), a dispro-
portionately large number. Additionally, local firms, 33.7% of 
identified practitioners, committed 42.1% of this type of viola-
tion. While Big Eight CPA firms were not cited once for prac-
tice violations, sole practitioners, 43.7% of the violators identi-
fied by practice, accounted for 60.0% of the violations in this 
area. Specifically, they were cited for 15 instances gross negli-
gence. Regarding competition violations, given their 10.0% pro-
portion among the group of violators, the eight accountants 
identified as Big Eight CPA firm practitioners were over-repre-
sented, accounting for 17.5% of the competit ion violations 
identifiable with a specific practice. The Board cited them for 
five solicitations of clients or encroachments on the practice of 
another accountant, three instances of advertising, two of com-
petitive bids, and one instance of engaging in an occupation 
incompatible with the profession. 
Sanctions 
The fourth hypothesis stated that during the period 1946 
through 1978, more serious violations in terms of harm to the 
public and client (i.e., breach of Integrity and Practice Rules) 
would trigger more severe punishments than would violation of 
rules impairing intraprofessional relationships (i.e., breach of 
Competition Rules). We classify sanctions which withdraw the 
practitioner's right to practice, i.e., revocation of the certificate 
and revocation of the permit, as severe. The results of the com-
parison of violation categories with sanctions, shown in Table 
7, support Hypothesis 4. 
30
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/3
Harston and Welch: Evolution of Professional Enforcement in Texas: 55 
An Examination of Violations and Sanctions 
TABLE 7 
Type of Sanction by Type of Violation (1946 - 1978) 
Type of Violation 
Violations 
Sanction 
Revoke Certificate* 
Revoke Permit* 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Subtotals 
Integrity 
Number % of 
Assessed Total 
27 
14 
15 
5 
0 
1 
12 
6 
1 
54 
20.0 
8.1* 
8.6* 
2.9 
0.0 
0.6 
6.9 
3.4 
0.6 
31.1 
Practice 
Number % of 
Assessed Total 
34 
17 
20 
6 
0 
1 
12 
5 
1 
62 
25.2 
9.7* 
11.5* 
3.4 
0.0 
0.6 
6.9 
2.9 
0.6 
35.6 
Competition 
Number % of 
Assessed Total 
74 
3 
8 
21 
2 
3 
9 
12 
0 
58 
54.8 
1.7 
4.6 
12.1* 
1.1 
1.7 
5.2 
6.9 
0.0 
33.3 
Total 
Number 
Assessed 
135 
34 
43 
32 
2 
5 
33 
23 
2 
174 
% of 
Total 
100.0 
19.5 
24.7 
18.4 
1.1 
2.9 
19.0 
13.2 
1.2 
100.0 
Integrity and practice Rules violations resulted in the most 
severe punishments, accounting for six times the serious sanc-
tions assessed for competition violations. Specifically, if the 
practitioner was convicted of a felony, the certificate and/or 
permit to practice was revoked. When CPAs were found guilty 
of gross negligence, they also received revocations of certificate 
and permit. For both categories of violations, the Board also 
published the names of those sanctioned. Loeb [1972, p.6] and 
Tidrick [1992, p . 171] also found linkage between the nature of 
the violation and the severity of the sanction. 
Competition violations accounted for two-thirds of the less 
severe punishments, issuance of various types of formal letters. 
Four different competition violations were significantly linked 
with sanctions. The Board wrote letters of reprimand for solici-
tation of clients of another accountant or for offering the em-
ployee of another accountant a job without receiving permis-
s ion . A l though t he Board only i s sued l e t t e r s of Rules 
clarification for advertising offenses, it also publicized those 
sanctioned. The Board also issued an advisory or warning letter 
for making a competitive bid for an engagement. 
Competition between CPAs and PAs, and the perception of 
some practitioners that PAs were inferior in expertise could 
have led to greater and more severe sanctions of PAs. Table 8 
presents punishments by professional designation, as well as by 
type of violation. 
Significant difference in sanctions assessed for violation category at .05 
probability level. 
* 
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TABLE 8 
Type of Sanction by Type of Violation (1946 - 1978) 
Comparison Between CPAs and PAs 
Summary of Total Violations 
Number 
% of Total Violations 
Summary of Total Sanctions 
Sanction 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Subtotals 
Number 
Assessed 
34 
28 
28 
2 
5 
28 
21 
2 
148 
CPAs 
111 
82.2 
CPAs 
% of 
CPA 
23.0 
18.9 
18.9 
1.4 
3.4 
18.9 
14.2 
1.4 
100.0 
Summary of Integrity Violations 
Number 
Percent of Integrity Violations 
%of 
Total 
19.6* 
16.1 
16.1 
1.1 
2.9 
16.1 
12.1* 
1.1 
85.1 
CPAs 
21 
77.8 
Sanctions for Integrity Violations 
Sanction 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Subtotals 
Number 
Assessed 
14 
10 
4 
0 
1 
9 
5 
_ 1 
44 
CPAs 
% of %of 
CPA Integrity 
31.8 
22.7 
9.1 
0.0 
2.3 
20.4 
11.4 
2.3 
100.0 
25.9^ 
18.6 
7.4 
0.0 
1.8 
16.7^ 
9.3 
1.8 
81.5 
PAs 
24 
18.8 
PAs 
Number % of 
Assessed PA 
0 0.0 
15 57.7 
4 15.4 
0 0.0 
0 0.0 
5 19.2 
2 7.7 
0 0.0 
26 100.0 
PAs 
6 
22.2 
PAs 
Number % of 
Total 
135 
100.0 
% of 
Total 
For 
Total Sanction 
0.0 
8.6* 
2.3 
0.0 
0.0 
2.9 
1.1 
0.0 
14.9 
Total 
27 
100.0 
%of 
Assessed PA Integrity ! 
* 0 0.0 
5 50.0 
1 10.0 
0 0.0 
0 0.0 
3 30.0 
1 10.0 
0 0.0 
10 100.0 
0.0 
9.3^* 
1.8 
0.0 
0.0 
5.6 
1.8 
0.0 
18.5 
34 
43 
32 
2 
5 
33 
23 
2 
174 
% of All 
Sanctions 
19.6 
24.7 
18.4 
1.1 
2.9 
19.0 
13.2 
1.1 
100.0 
Total 
For 
Sanction 
14 
15 
5 
0 
1 
12 
6 
1 
54 
% of All 
Sanctions 
8.1 
8.6 
2.9 
0.0 
0.6 
6.9 
3.4 
0.6 
31.1 
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TABLE 8 (CONTINUED) 
Type of Sanction by Type of Violation (1946 - 1978) 
Comparison Between CPAs and PAs 
Summary of Practice Violations 
57 
Number 
Percent of Practice Violations 
Sanctions for Practice Violations 
Sanction 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Subtotals 
Number 
Assessed 
17 
14 
5 
0 
1 
11 
5 
1 
54 
CPAs 
% of 
CPA 
31.5 
25.9 
9.2 
0.0 
1.9 
20.4 
9.2 
1.9 
100.0 
CPAs 
27 
79.4 
% of 
Practice 
27.4^* 
22.6 
8.1 
0.0 
1.6 
17.7* 
8.1 
1.6 
87.1 
Summary of Competition Violations 
CPAs 
Number 
Percent of Competition Violations 
Sanctions for Competition \ 
Number 
Assessed 
Sanction 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Subtotals 
3 
4 
19 
2 
3 
8 
11 
0 
50 
63 
85.1 
Violations 
CPAs 
% of % of 
CPA Competition 
6.0 
8.0 
38.0 
4.0 
6.0 
16.0 
22.0 
0.0 
100.0 
5.2* 
6.9 
PAs 
7 
20.6 
Total 
34 
100.0 
PAs 
Number % of % of 
Assessed PA Practice 
0 
6 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
8 
0.0 
75.0 
12.5 
0.0 
0.0 
12.5 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
PAs 
11 
14.9 
0.0 
9.7 ^* 
1.6 
0.0 
0.0 
1.6 
0.0 
0.0 
12.9 
Total 
For 
Sanction 
17 
20 
6 
0 
1 
12 
5 
1 
62 
Total 
74 
100.0 
PAs 
Number % of % of 
Assessed PA Competition 
0 
4 
32.7^* 2 
3.5 
5.2 
13.7 
19.0 
0.0 
86.2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
8 
0.0 
50.0 
25.0 
0.0 
0.0 
12.5 
12.5 
0.0 
100.0 
0.0 
6.9* 
3.5 
0.0 
0.0 
1.7 
1.7 
0.0 
13.8 
% of All 
9.8 
11.4 
3.4 
0.0 
0.6 
6.9 
2.9 
0.6 
35.6 
Total 
For 
Sanction 
3 
8 
21 
2 
3 
9 
12 
0 
58 
% of All 
Sanctions 
1.7 
4.5 
12.1 
1.2 
1.7 
5.2 
6.9 
0.0 
33.3 
Significant difference between CPAs and PAs in sanction assessed at .05 
probability level. 
Significant relationship between violation type and sanction assessed at .05 
probability level. 
Of total sanctions received by CPAs, 41.9% resulted in the 
loss of the ability to continue to practice. Regarding PAs sanc-
tions, 57.7% resulted in the loss of the ability to continue to 
* 
^ 
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practice. This appears to lend support to the notion of Hypoth-
esis 3, that PAs were subject to more severe sanctions. 
We further examined sanctions between the two groups of 
professionals to determine whether the more severe sanctions 
accorded PAs could be linked to differences in the types of 
violations they committed. Given the number of integrity viola-
tions each committed, we found little difference between CPAs 
and PAs in the proportion of total sanctions accorded to each 
which were serious (54.5% and 50.0%, respectively). However, 
variation in sanctions was found for practice and competition 
violations. The Board cited CPAs for 79.4% of practice viola-
tions, but assessed them with 87.1% of the sanctions. However, 
of these sanctions, 57.4% were serious, compared with 75.0% of 
those imposed on PAs. Fourteen percent of the sanctions meted 
out to CPAs for competition violations were serious, versus 
50.0% of those meted out to PAs. Additionally, three of the four 
CPAs who lost their permits due to violation of competition 
rules were also cited for practice or integrity violations for, the 
same incidents. Three of the four PAs, however, lost their per-
mits when they engaged in competition violations only. In sum-
mary, while similar punishment was meted out for integrity 
violations, CPAs received more sanctions for practice violations, 
and PAs received more severe punishment for both practice and 
competition violations. These findings tend to support Hypoth-
esis 3 regarding sanctions. 
Comparisons Between Enforcement Periods 
Hypothesis 5a proposed that enforcement activity would 
have increased following the 1961 statutory change allowing 
the Board autonomous enforcement in terms of the number of 
citations for violations. Table 9 separates information regarding 
offense categories and specific violations into the time periods 
in which they occurred. The two periods in this study were 
almost equal in length: the early period, from 1946 through 
1961, encompassed 16 years, and late period, from 1962 
through 1978, comprised 17 years. 
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/3
TA
BL
E 
9 
Sp
ec
if
ic
 
V
io
la
tio
ns
 
O
ve
r 
T
im
e 
Ti
m
e 
Pe
rio
d 
C
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
V
io
la
to
rs
 
In
vo
lv
ed
 
V
io
la
ti
on
 
In
te
gr
it
y 
R
ul
es
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
N
am
e 
C
O
N
TI
N
G
T 
FI
N
TR
ST
 
SC
H
O
O
L 
N
O
N
IN
D
PT
 
FE
LO
N
Y
 
T
ot
al
 
in
te
gr
ity
 
v
io
la
tio
ns
 
in
 
pe
ri
od
 
P
ra
ct
ic
e 
R
ul
es
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
N
am
e 
C
O
N
FI
D
E 
E
M
PS
V
C
S 
C
O
R
P 
N
E
G
LE
C
T 
SI
G
N
R
EV
W
 
FO
R
EC
A
ST
 
T
ot
al
 
pr
ac
ti
ce
 
v
io
la
tio
ns
 
in
 
pe
ri
od
 
17
 1 0 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 6 0 
_
0 6
 
%
 
81
.0
 
4.
2 
0.
0 
0.
0 
4.
2*
 
8.
3 
16
.7
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
25
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
25
.0
 
Ea
rly
 
Pe
ri
od
 
(19
46
-19
61
) 
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
%
 
19
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
12
.5
*
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
12
.5
 
To
ta
l i
n
 
Pe
ri
od
 
N
um
be
r 
21
 1 0 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 9 0 0 9 
%
 
10
0.
0 
4.
2 
0.
0 
0.
0 
4.
2 
8.
3 
16
.7
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
37
.5
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
37
.5
 
C
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
71
 1 1 0 0 15
 
17
 0 0 0 21
 0 0 21
 
%
 
79
.8
 
0.
9 
0.
9 
0.
0 
0.
0 
13
.5
 
15
.3
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
18
.9
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
18
.9
 
La
te
 
Pe
rio
d 
(19
62
-19
78
) 
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
18
 0 0 0 2 
_
4 6
 0 0 0 3 1 0 4 
%
 
20
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
1.8
 
3.
6 
5.
4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
2.
7 
0.
9 
0.
0 
3.
6 
To
ta
l i
n
 
Pe
rio
d 
N
um
be
r 
89
 1 1 0 2 19
 
23
 0 0 0 24
 1 0 25
 
%
 
10
0.
0 
0.
9 
0.
9 
0.
0 
1.8
 
17
.1
 
20
.7
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
21
.6
 
0.
9 
0.
0 
22
.5
 
O
ve
ra
ll 
(19
46
-19
78
) 
To
ta
l 
N
um
be
r 
11
0 2 1 0 3 21
 
27
 0 0 0 33
 1 0 34
 
%
 
10
0.
0 
1.5
 
0.
7 
0.
0 
2.
2 
15
.6
 
20
.0
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
24
.5
 
0.
7 
0.
0 
25
.2
 
Harston and Welch: Evolution of Professional Enforcement in Texas: 
An Examination of Violations and Sanctions 
59 
35
Harston and Welch: Evolution of professional enforcement in Texas : An examination of violations and sanctions
Published by eGrove, 1997
TA
BL
E 
9 
(C
ON
TI
NU
ED
) 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
V
io
la
tio
ns
 
O
ve
r 
Ti
m
e 
T
im
e 
P
er
io
d 
C
om
pe
ti
ti
on
 
R
ul
es
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
N
am
e 
PR
A
C
N
A
M
E 
O
TH
R
O
C
C
U
 
C
O
M
M
IS
S 
IN
C
O
M
PA
T 
SO
LI
C
IT
 
ST
EA
LE
M
P 
A
D
V
ER
T+
 
C
O
M
PE
TE
 
D
E
SC
R
IB
E 
T
ot
al
 
c
o
m
pe
ti
ti
on
 
v
io
la
tio
ns
 
in
 
pe
ri
od
 
T
ot
al
 
v
io
la
ti
on
s 
in
 
pe
ri
od
 
C
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
0 0 0 0 5 2 2 1 0 10
 
20
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
20
.8
 
8.
3*
 
8.
3 
4.
2 
0.
0 
41
.6
 
83
.3
 
E
ar
ly
 
P
er
io
d 
(1
94
6-
19
61
) 
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
1 4 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
4.
2*
 
4.
2 
16
.7
 
T
ot
al
 
in
 
P
er
io
d 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
0 0 0 0 5 2 2 1 1 11
 
24
 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
0.
0 
20
.8
 
8.
3 
8.
3 
4.
2 
4.
2 
45
.8
 
10
0.
0 
C
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
0 5 0 1 21
 2 12
 
12
 
_
0 53
 
91
 
0.
0 
4.
6 
0.
0 
0.
9 
18
.9
 
1.
8 
10
.8
 
10
.8
 
0.
0 
47
.8
 
82
.0
 
L
at
e 
P
er
io
d 
(1
96
2-
19
78
) 
PA
 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
1 0 1 0 3 0 3 2 0 10
 
20
 
0.
9 
0.
0 
0.
9 
0.
0 
2.
7 
0.
0 
2.
7 
1.
8 
0.
0 
9.
0 
18
.0
 
T
ot
al
 
in
 
P
er
io
d 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
1 5 1 1 24
 2 15
 
14
 0 63
 
11
1 
0.
9 
4.
6 
0.
9 
0.
9 
21
.6
 
1.
8 
13
.5
 
12
.6
 
0.
0 
56
.8
 
10
0.
0 
O
ve
ra
ll 
(1
94
6-
19
78
) 
T
ot
al
 
N
um
be
r 
%
 
1 5 1 1 29
 4 17
 
15
 1 
74
 
13
5 
0.
7 
3.
7 
0.
7 
0.
7 
21
.5
 
3.
0 
12
.7
 
11
.1
 
0.
7 
54
.8
 
10
0.
0 
O
ne
 
a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
v
io
la
tio
n
 
in
 
fir
st
 
pe
ri
od
 
n
o
t i
de
nt
if
ie
d 
by
 
ty
pe
 
o
f 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
.
 
Si
gn
if
ic
an
t 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
CP
A
s 
a
n
d 
PA
s 
in
 
sa
n
c
ti
on
 
a
ss
e
ss
e
d 
a
t 
.
05
 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
le
ve
l. 
+
 
*
 
60 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1997 
36
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/3
Harston and Welch: Evolution of Professional Enforcement in Texas: 61 
An Examination of Violations and Sanctions 
The Board initiated much more enforcement activity fol-
lowing its empowerment. It issued four integrity violation cita-
tions in the early period, compared with 23 citations from 1962 
through 1978. Practice violation citations were as follows: nine 
citations in the early period, and 25 citations in the late period. 
Competition violation citations increased from 11 from 1946 
through 1961, to 63 from 1962 through 1978. However, these 
numbers may reflect the increase in the overall number of li-
censed practitioners. 
An examination by type of professional yields additional 
insight. In the first period, during which CPA and PA numbers 
reached approximate parity, CPAs were subject to five times the 
number of the citations as PAs. In the late period, the increase 
in the number of citations is more proportional to the increase 
the number of CPAs. While the number of CPAs slightly more 
than tripled during late period, from 5,686 professionals in 
1962 to 19,533 in 1979 [Records, 1962; Tinsley, Undated, pp. 
27, 45], the number of violations cited increased over fourfold. 
PA numbers dropped to approximately a quarter of their high-
est membership by 1970 [Tinsley, pp. 27, 45], yet the number of 
violations for which they were cited quintupled, from four to 
20. The CPAs' share of total citations declined slightly (from 
83.3% to 82.0%) as their numbers increased significantly, while 
there was a slight increase in the proportion of total citations 
issued to PAs (from 16.7% to 18.0%). These results lend support 
for both Hypotheses 3 and 5a regarding citations. Violation 
citations increased for both CPAs and PAs, but especially for 
PAs, given the decline in their numbers. 
We additionally examined the citations in light of the types 
of violations enforced, and found that the relative mix of viola-
tions also varied between periods. The ratio of integrity viola-
tions increased from 16.7% to 20.7% of total violations between 
the early and late periods, reaching approximate parity with 
practice violations in the late period. The proportion of practice 
violations to total violations decreased significantly, from 
37.5% to 22.5% of total violations between periods. The propor-
tion of competition violations over the periods increased from 
45.8% to 56.8% of all citations for which hearings were held. 
The increasing professional concern regarding substandard 
practice during the late period is not reflected in the number of 
citations for practice violations, where it would be expected, 
but it may be reflected in the increase in integrity rules enforce-
ment. Competitive behavior continued to command the largest 
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share of the Board's attention. 
Hypothesis 5b predicted that enforcement activity would 
have increased following the 1961 statutory change allowing 
the Board autonomous enforcement in terms of severity of 
sanctions. Tables 10 and 11 present information regarding 
sanctions in the two enforcement periods. 
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TABLE 11 
Sanctions Dispensed To Type of Professional 
by Type of Violation Over Time 
PA 
Type of Violation x ^  
In Period 
Integrity Practice Competition 
Early Period (1946-1961) 
Violations 
Total Number 
Total Serious 
Sanction + 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand@ 
Publicize 
Close File 
Total sanctions 
Total serious sanctionss 
Late Period (1962-1978) 
Violations 
Total Number 
Total Serious 
Sanction + 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Publicize 
Close File 
Total sanctions 
Total serious sanctionss 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
6 
5 
1 
3 
1 
10 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
0 
0 
3 
2 
4 
4 
4 
0 
1 
0 
5 
4 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
10 
0 
4 
2 
1 
1 
8 
4 
Total 
4 
3 
2 
2 
0 
0 
4 
2 
20 
10 
13 
3 
5 
2 
23 
13 
In Period 
% of PA % of Total 
100.0 
75.0 
50.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
50.0 
100.0 
50.0 
56.5 
13.0 
21.7 
8.7 
100.0 
56.5 
16.7 
23.1 
6.9 
6.9 
0.0 
0.0 
13.8 
20.0 
18.0 
20.8 
9.0 
2.1 
3.5 
1.4 
16.0 
19.1 
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Sanctions Dispensed To Type of Professional 
by Type of Violation Over Time 
65 
CPA 
Type of Violation x^ 
In Period In Period 
Integrity 
Early Period (1946-1961) 
Violations 
Total Number 
Total Serious 
Sanction + 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand@ 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Total sanctions 
Total serious sanctionss 
Late Period (1962-1978) 
Violations 
Total Number 
Total Serious 
Sanction + 
Revoke Certificate 
Revoke Permit 
Letter of Reprimand 
Advise/Warn 
Other Letter 
Publicize 
Close File 
Wait 
Total sanctions 
Total serious sanctionss 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
5 
2 
17 
17 
11 
10 
2 
0 
0 
7 
3 
1 
34 
21 
Practice 
6 
6 
3 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
10 
6 
21 
21 
14 
13 
2 
0 
1 
11 
3 
1 
45 
27 
Competition 
10 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
6 
10 
0 
53 
0 
3 
4 
17 
2 
2 
7 
6 
1 
42 
7 
Total 
20 
10 
4 
4 
5 
0 
1 
2 
9 
25 
8 
91 
38 
28 
27 
21 
2 
3 
25 
12 
3 
121 
55 
% of PA 
100.0 
50.0 
16.0 
16.0 
20.0 
0.0 
4.0 
8.0 
36.0 
100.0 
32.0 
100.0 
41.8 
23.1 
22.3 
17.4 
1.6 
2.5 
20.7 
9.9 
2.5 
100.0 
45.4 
% of Total 
83.3 
76.9 
13.7 
13.7 
17.2 
0.0 
13.7 
6.9 
31.0 
86.2 
80.0 
82.0 
79.2 
19.4 
18.7 
14.6 
1.4 
2.1 
17.4 
8.3 
2.1 
84.0 
80.9 
Single individual may be subject to more than one violation and sanction. 
If more than one instance of the same type violation in one hearing, type 
was counted only once. 
One reprimand for adveritizing violation in first period not identified by 
type of professional 
Significant relationship between sanction and type of violation in period at 
.05 probability level. 
Serious sanctions involve loss of ability to practice (revocation of certificate 
and revocation of permit. 
X 
^ 
@ 
+ 
S 
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As discussed in the section on the history of enforcement, 
an increase in the number and severity of punishments was 
expected. Results, shown in Table 10, indicate an increase, 
overall, in both the number of sanctions levied per practitioner 
and the number levied per violation between the two periods. 
Sanctions averaged 1.38 per person in the early period, versus 
1.62 per person in the late period. Each violation earned, on 
average, 1.21 sanctions from 1946 to 1961 versus 1.30 sanctions 
from 1962 to 1978. In addition, the proportion of all sanctions 
considered to be severe (revocation of certificate and revocation 
of permit) increased from 34.5% in the first period to 45.1% in 
the second period. The results support Hypothesis 5b. 
We made a comparison of sanctions levied against CPAs 
versus those levied against PAs, grouped by the period in which 
the punishment was levied. Results, also shown in Table 10, 
indicate that the proportion of total sanctions (combination of 
both CPAs and PAs) represented by revocation of certificates 
and revocation of permits increased in the second period for 
both CPAs, from 27.6% to 38.1%, and for PAs, rising from 6.9% 
to 9.0%. 
Further examination involved a comparison of the sanc-
tions between the two periods and professional designations, 
given the type of violation. Our results, shown in Table 11, 
indicate that while the proportion of serious sanctions to total 
sanctions against both CPAs and PAs increased from the early 
to the late period, in both periods severe PA punishments ex-
ceeded those for CPAs on a proportional basis. This occurred 
while the proportion of serious violations (integrity and prac-
tice) committed by PAs dropped, from 23.1% of all early serious 
violations (committed by both PAs and CPAs) to 20.8% of all 
late serious violations. Of the total CPAs violations during the 
early period, 50.0% were serious. Of their sanctions during that 
period, 32.0% resulted in revocation of certificates and permits. 
During the early period, 50.0% of PA sanctions resulted in loss 
of permit, when 75.0% of the violations were serious. In the late 
period, the proportion of CPA sanctions resulting in loss of 
ability to practice was 45.4%, while the proportion of serious to 
total violations was 41.8%. For PAs, 56.5% of the sanctions 
were serious, punishing violations of which 50.0% were serious. 
However, it should be noted that the Board initiated a 42.2% 
increase in the number of severe sanctions for CPAs, for only a 
3.0% increase in the proportion of serious violations committed 
by them. In addition, a higher proportion of PAs than CPAs lost 
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their ability to practice in the late period for competition viola-
tions. These results lend support for Hypothesis 5b. PAs, how-
ever, appeared to receive more severe treatment for less serious 
violations, providing partial support for Hypothesis 3. 
DISCUSSION 
From 1945 through 1978, certain demographic characteris-
tics were associated with the incidence of Rules violations of 
CPAs. College-educated professionals and those trained by Big 
Eight CPA firms appeared better prepared to adhere to stan-
dards. Education, championed by the accounting profession as 
the path to expertise and passage of the CPA. exam, was used 
not only to signal competence for applicant accountants, but to 
differentiate CPAs from PAs. The results of this study lend cre-
dence to the linkage between education and expertise. Those 
CPA practitioners with less education, may have possessed less 
accounting knowledge and may have been more prone to Rules 
violations. However, the study does not examine whether lack 
of expertise specifically caused illicit behavior. 
CPAs engaged as sole practitioners or in local partnerships 
were more likely to be cited for violations. Loeb [1971, pp. 297-
298, 301] in a 1969 study of Wisconsin CPAs found that accoun-
tants in large public accounting firms were more accepting of 
and possessed greater adherence to ethical norms than medium 
and small firms. He reasoned that large firms may have faced 
greater responsibility and higher penalties than small firms for 
unethical behavior. Yerkes [1975, p . 139] argued that since ac-
countants working for national firms perform more audits and 
have closer relations with professional colleagues than those 
with smaller firms, they should exhibit higher ethical behavior 
than practitioners from smaller firms and firms solely consist-
ing of PAs. Abbott [1988, pp. 137-138], however, suggests that 
dominant professions often possess sufficient power to define 
services and measurements of success that make them appear 
effective and, in the short run through these definitions, protect 
their members from claims of incompetence from external 
forces. Abbott's [1988, pp. 137-138] theory may apply to profes-
sions at a micro level. Big Eight CPA firms may have been 
sufficiently empowered and positioned within the business 
community to shelter their practicing accountants from allega-
tions. Alternatively, the CPA working alone or in the local part-
nership may have accepted engagements for which requisite 
43
Harston and Welch: Evolution of professional enforcement in Texas : An examination of violations and sanctions
Published by eGrove, 1997
68 The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1997 
competence was lacking. However, considering Loeb's results 
[1971, pp. 297, 305], the Big-Eight CPA offices may have had a 
slightly higher acceptance of ethical norms than local partner-
ships and sole practitioner offices, and acted accordingly. 
Abbott [1988, pp. 2, 316-319] alleges that interprofessional 
competition over the jurisdiction of provided services is one of 
the major factors in determining the evolution of any profes-
sion.26 Both the theory regarding professions and the history of 
the Texas accounting profession point to conflict between CPAs 
and PAs over the domain of accounting services. Given the ma-
jority power of the more prestigious CPA tier on the Board, the 
literature leads to an expectation of more enforcement activity 
taken against PAs than CPAs, especially during the second pe-
riod when PA strength on the Board began to decline. While 
enforcement in the first period appeared to target CPAs, the 
expectation of a proportionately higher incidence of violations 
and sanctions for PAs appears to be born out in the second 
period, when the Board had stronger enforcement power. PAs 
received more severe punishment in both periods. 
Two elements may explain the higher overall incidence of 
competition violations: Board constraints and practitioner ac-
cessibility to facts. Board Minutes provide evidence that lack of 
funding, resources spent on administering applications and ex-
aminations, and insufficient legal power were primary factors 
in determining the degree and quality of enforcement proce-
d u r e s . The B o a r d f r equen t ly e m p l o y e d an u n c o m -
plicated, inexpensive method to detect competitive behavior by 
canvassing telephone directories and newspaper listings for ad-
vertising and solicitation infractions [Minutes, June 8, 1954, 
September 29, 1958]. Such canvassing produced numerous 
Board-initiated citations concerning competitive behavior. In 
addition, practitioners usually had no access to audit records of 
their competitors and may not have been able to detect and 
report practice violations concerning negligent practice. The 
percentage increase in competition violations from the early to 
the late period indicated a continued Board emphasis in com-
petitive behavior issues. Regarding the less punitive use of rep-
26Although Abbott [1988, p. 2] discusses competition for work between 
professions, his theory is also applicable to jurisdictional disputes between two 
sub-groups of a profession such as CPAs and PAs. Lubell [1980, p. 368] con-
cludes tha t the conflict be tween CPAs and PAs was external or inter-
professional. 
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r imands and other letters for competitive behavior citations, 
accounting leaders, al though concerned about mainta ining 
"professional attitude" and distinguishing the profession from 
ordinary commercial enterprises, possibly were not willing to 
inflict severe punishment for competitive behavior, a part and 
parcel of "doing business." Pressure from government, and pub-
lic and professional concern over cases of malpractice called for 
a more punitive response for practice and integrity violations. 
This partial analysis of the enforcement activity in Texas 
concurs with literature from the sociology of professions, main-
taining that professions are a process [Caplow, 1966, pp. 20-21; 
Wilensky, 1964, pp. 142, 157; Lubell, 1980, pp. 44, 57; Freidson, 
1986, pp. 30-32]. Proof of professional process is evidenced by 
the fact that Board enforcement activities increased for all 
types of violations during the early 1960s. While the Board in-
creased the proportion of integrity violations heard during from 
1962 through 1978, it continued to process more competition 
than integrity or practice violations. As the records do not indi-
cate whe the r m e m b e r activity grew more competen t , or 
whether fewer complaints resulted in formal hearings, no con-
clusion can be drawn regarding the true incidence of malprac-
tice versus competitive behavior violations. The lack of enforce-
ment funding and legal power, ease in detecting advertising and 
solicitation offenses, fear of losing control over the competitive 
behavior of practitioners, a tenacious concern with preventing 
competitive bidding, and during the 1970s, a defensive stance 
against attack by the Federal government over Rules banning 
competitive behavior were probable reasons for the proportion-
ally small enforcement efforts against more serious practice 
violations [Tinsley, 1983, p. 133]. 
The historical evolution of the Texas accounting profession, 
especially that period covering the decline of non-certified prac-
titioners, may offer implications for the accounting profession 
in the future. Abbott [1988, pp. 19, 137] warns that a profession 
is determined by the manner in which the content of "work" 
and jurisdiction over provided services change and by the man-
ner in which that "work" is controlled by various occupational 
groups. Despite a majority in numbers, in 1946, PA practitio-
ners choosing to remain as PAs, lost jurisdictional domain due 
to a lack of understanding of shifting market demands for more 
complex services requir ing expert j udgment as evidenced 
through certification. Perceived expertise, as embodied in the 
CPA exam, placed certified accountants above their less creden-
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tialed counterpar ts . PAs forfeited the ability to define the 
accountant's task by failing to become the experts in abstract 
knowledge. The ability of current practicing CPAs to define 
their "work" may be in jeopardy today. Chenok [1995, p. 68] 
alerts the profession that survival of public accounting depends 
not only on the provision of quality service, but upon the ability 
of firms to provide a "broad range of specialized services" in 
order to compete against providers external to the accounting 
profession. Abbott [1988, pp. 317, 324] maintains that profes-
sions constantly need to reassess services, redefine professional 
knowledge, and redetermine division of labor. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses the evolution of accounting profes-
sional regulation in Texas from 1915 through 1979 and associ-
ates the competitive process within the profession to Rules vio-
lations and enforcement during the period in which the 1945 
Act was in effect. The Act and the Rules of Professional Con-
duct reflected the emergence of professional self-regulation 
through the influence of the TSCPA on the Board. In an effort 
to determine compliance with professional standards in the 
workplace, this study indirectly observed the behavior of practi-
tioners by examining violation and sanction records. 
Anecdotal evidence from the history of the Texas account-
ing profession, in addition to the results of this study, raise 
questions regarding the ability of the Board and the profession 
to obtain access to critical information regarding malpractice 
and to regulate practitioner behavior. Despite national and lo-
cal concern over malpractice issues, results of the study suggest 
that intraprofessional competition surfaced as a substantial ex-
planatory factor with professional preparation appearing as a 
differentiating variable between violators and non-violators. 
CPA practitioners with a college education and Big Eight firm 
training were less prone to be cited for Rules violations. Con-
flict between CPAs and PAs over the domain of accounting ser-
vices may have impacted enforcement activity. Proportionately 
more violations were heard and more severe sanctions were 
issued against PAs than CPAs during the second period under 
study. Although the percentage of citations involving integrity 
violations increased over time, those concerning practice Rules 
declined. A large portion of enforcement activity continued to 
pertain to competitive behavior allegations. Although sanctions 
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were greater during the 1960s after the Board became empow-
ered by legislative amendments to investigate and discipline 
violators, continued evidence of substandard practice in the his-
tory literature raises questions about the effectiveness of the 
accounting profession's regulatory framework. 
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